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Effects of Credit Constraint on Productivity 
and Rural Household Income in China 
 
Introduction 
China has been undertaking economic reforms since 1978. While urban residents’ income 
increased from 343 Yuan in 1978 to 13,786 Yuan in 2007, farmers’ income has continued to lag 
behind (from 134 Yuan in 1978 to 4,140 Yuan in 2007). With increasing agricultural 
productivity and farmers’ income always an important consideration for the government, it is 
crucial to investigate elements affecting productivity and find ways to improve rural household 
income.       
Agricultural production is strongly conditioned by the fact that inputs are transformed 
into outputs with considerable time lags (Conning and Udry, 2005), causing the rural household 
to need to balance its budget during the season when there are high expenditures for input 
purchase and consumption and few revenues. With limited access to credit, the budget balance 
within the year can become a constraint to agricultural production. When liquidity is a binding 
constraint, the amounts and combinations of inputs used by a farmer may deviate from optimal 
levels which in turn limit the optimum production or consumption choices. The marginal 
contribution of credit therefore brings input levels closer to the optimal levels, thereby increasing 
yield and output (Feder et al. 1990). Some empirical literature found that in rural areas of 
developing countries, credit constraints have significant adverse effects on farm output (Feder et. 
al., 1990; Sial and Carter, 1996), farm investment (Carter and Olinto, 2003), and farm profit 
(Carter, 1989).  Thus, one motivation underlying many government programs is to seek to 
provide more credit to the farm sector to improve farm productivity and income.          2 
 
Like in many developing countries, Chinese rural households have been suffering from a 
lack of access to capital (Dong and Featherstone, 2006; International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, 2001; Yu, 2008; and Luo, 2003). Rural capital sources include government 
financial support, formal and informal credit markets. Because industry development is the focus 
of the national development, more government financial support goes to urban industry and 
therefore, agricultural financial support from the government is limited. In addition, agricultural 
support generally goes to agricultural infrastructure construction, not to individual rural 
households. Informal rural credit is an important part of rural credit. But most of the informal 
credit is reportedly obtained for purposes other than production, with construction, social 
expenditures (wedding, funeral, etc.), and consumption appearing dominant (Feder, et al. 1990). 
Due to limited fungibility, informal credit is not a good substitute for formal credit (Feder, et al, 
1990; Chen, 2003). Formal credit is mostly used for the financing of agricultural production 
(Feder, et al., 1990). The formal financial institutions currently serving rural China include the 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), Rural 
Credit Cooperatives (RCCs), and Rural Postal Savings (RPSs). Because of operational costs, 
high financial risk, and low return (Dong and Featherstone, 2006), formal financial institutions 
have strict requirements for rural loans and have limiting lending. Although a majority of its 
deposits from rural areas, the ABC’s support to agriculture has been decreasing since its 
allocation of resources expanded to cities and industries in the mid-1990s. As saving-only 
financial institutions, RPSs channel funds from rural to urban areas. Currently, RCCs are 
dominant players in rural lending markets.  
To improve the capital shortages in rural China, the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) relaxed the conditions of entry for financial institutions in rural areas at the 3 
 
end of 2006, allowing investors to set up new types of rural financial institutions such as 
township and village banks and rural mutual cooperatives. At the end of 2007, 38 new types of 
rural financial institutions had obtained licenses, including 25 township and village banks, four 
loan companies and nine rural mutual cooperatives. The total loans outstanding related to 
agriculture reached 6.09 trillion yuan, of which direct agricultural loans amounted to 1.57 trillion 
yuan (Cao, 2009). In addition, to enhance micro credit in rural areas, the CBRC also expanded 
the list of qualified micro-credit lenders from rural credit unions to all banking institutions. The 
size of allowable credit lines was raised from a range of 3,000 to 5,000 yuan to a range of 10,000 
yuan to as much as 3 million yuan. The loan terms extend from less than one year to as long as 
three years. However, rural financial institutions still need time to expand their coverage from 
pilot areas in the countryside to remote areas to satisfy more capital-hungry farmers nationwide 
(Cao, 2009). Credit constraints still exist in most rural areas, which have forced farmers to 
deviate from optimal resource allocation and production arrangements.  
While rural credit plays an important role in agricultural and rural development, few 
studies have focused on the impact of credit on agricultural production in China. The exception 
is Feder, et al (1990) when they examine the impact of credit on productivity in Chinese 
agriculture using data collected in 1987 in Gongzhuling, Jilin province. However, at that time, 
the household responsibility system just started. After more than 20 years of development, 
dramatic changes have occurred, such as grain market reforms, rural financial reforms, and the 
exemption of agricultural tax
1. Consequently, it is necessary to reexamine how credit constraints 
affect agricultural productivity and rural household income in China.  
                                                 
1 Agricultural tax was a lump-sum fee paid by farmers based on the amount of cultivated land and number of family 
members. It was abolished in 2006. 4 
 
  An important issue in the context of agricultural credit policy is the magnitude of the 
expected productivity gain. If the marginal productivity effect of credit is small, then the 
resources may be more beneficially deployed elsewhere. Assessment of the expected 
productivity gain is not trivial because the effect of credit is likely to differ between liquidity-
constrained and unconstrained farm households. This study provides valuable information for 
policy makers on how credit constraints affect productivity and rural household income and how 
large the marginal effects of additional credit is. To tap the potential for broad-based economic 
growth, an understanding of agricultural credit constraints on agricultural productivity and rural 
household income is essential. 
Research Methodology 
When estimating the impact of credit constraint on productivity, two issues come up. The first is 
heterogeneity between credit constrained and non-constrained households. All credit constrained 
and non-constrained households are not homogenous with respect to their credit demand (Feder 
et al. 1990). For example, many non-borrowers do not borrow because they have sufficient 
liquidity and do not need to, while some do not borrow because they cannot borrow because of 
credit constraints. In addition, the effect on agricultural productivity may not be independent of 
credit status. Under credit constraints, factors of production may have differential effects on 
agricultural productivity than with credit being unconstrained. Therefore, estimation methods 
that pool all sampled observations to estimate production/output functions with credit as an input 
or a determinant can be inappropriate. Separate functions for credit constrained and non-
constrained household should be specified. The second issue is endogeneity. Households that are 
not credit constrained can separate consumption decisions from farm production decisions and 
choose production inputs optimally for the production process (Foltz, 2004). In contrast, credit 5 
 
constrained households may deviate from input optimal levels to allocate limited available 
resources between consumption and production, and thus have lower productivity. Therefore, 
possible sample selection bias may arise. The econometric problem will thus involve both 
heterogeneity and sample selection. This motivates the use of an endogenous switching 
regression model that accounts for both heterogeneity and sample selection bias.  
  Thus, we apply an endogenous switching regression approach where a probit model is 
applied in the first stage to determine the relationship between household’s credit constraint 
condition and a number of socio-economic and credit variables. A household was credit 
constrained if the household requested more loans than supplied, or it required loans but were 
unable to borrow. In the second stage, separate regression equations are set up to model the 
productivity of the household conditional on a specified credit status. 
The credit constraint condition of the ith household is described by an excess credit 
demand function, I
*, that is postulated to be a function of a vector of explanatory variables (Feder, 
et al. 1990; Freeman, Ehui, Jabbar, 1998).  
*
ii i I Zu                             (1)         
where Z is a vector of exogenous variables,  is a vector of parameters, and  i u is a random 
disturbance. Households are credit constraint if the excess demand is greater than zero. The 
function that indicates the household’s credit constraint status is defined as 
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where  1i y and  2i y are the productivity for credit constrained and credit unconstrained households, 
respectively.  1i X and  2i X   are vectors of exogenous variables.  1   and  2  are vectors of 
parameters. And  1i   and  2i  are random disturbance terms. Here i u ,  1i   and  2i  are assumed to 
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where 
2
1  and 
2
2  are variances of the error terms,  1i   and  2i  ,  in the equation (3), 
2
u  is the 
variance of the error term,  i u , in the equation (2), and  12   , 1u  , and  2u   are, respectively, the 
covariance of  1i   and  2i  ,  1i   and  i u , and  2i  and  i u . 
2
u   is assumed to be 1 because  is 
estimable only up to a scale factor (Maddala, 1983).  
Because the disturbance terms in equation (3) are conditional on the sample selection 
criterion and thus have non-zero expected values, the OLS estimates of  1  and  2  will suffer 
from sample selection bias and are inconsistent (Maddala 1983; Lee 1978).  Some studies have 
used a two-stage estimation method to estimate this system of equations of (2) and (3) (Lee, 
1978; Feder, et al, 1990; Freeman, Ehui, and Jabbar, 1998). Freeman, Ehui, and Jabbar (1998) 
used weighted least squares to account for the heteroscedastic errors. However, the use of 
weighted least squares is limited only to situations where the exact form of heteroscedasticity is 
known, which is rarely the case (Alene and Manyong, 2007).  
To estimate the endogenous switching regression model more efficiently, we use the full 
information maximum likelihood (FIML) method (Lokshin and Sajaja 2004; Greene 2000). The 7 
 
FIML method simultaneously estimates the probit equation and the regression equations to yield 
consistent standard errors. The log likelihood function for this model is  
22 11 1
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where F is a cumulative normal distribution function,  f is a normal density distribution function, 
11 1 / uu     is the correlation coefficient between  1i   and  i u , and  22 2 / uu      is the 
correlation coefficient between  2i   and  i u . Only one value of y,  1i y  or 2i y , is actually observed 
for any given household, depending upon which regime that particular household is in, credit 
constrained or unconstrained. Therefore,  12   does not occur in the likelihood function and is not 
estimable.  
Data  
The data used in this study came from a rural financial survey conducted in Xinglonggang 
County, Heilongjiang province in 2008. Farmers in Xionglonggang County produce mainly 
soybeans, corn, wheat, rice, and sweet beets. Raising cattle or sheep were also important. After 
deleting all households with missing values, the sample comprised of 511 rural households that 
accounted for 18.3% of the total 2,794 rural households in Xinglonggang County. The survey 
asked demographic questions including age of the household head, education, household size, 
household labor, and how many college students. The survey also asked financial and 
operational questions such as value of real estate (house), major operations (farm, off farm, or 
both), saving, income, and production inputs and outputs, whether the farmer had a loan, the 8 
 
amount of the loan, the use of the loan, if the loan needed collateral or pledge, if a loan was 
received before, and whether the loan was repaid on time.  
  The summary statistics of the data are listed in table 1. The dependent variable in the 
criterion equation is the household’s credit constraint condition (Constraint). A household was 
credit constraint if the household desired for credit, but could not get all that was desired. This 
variable (Constraint) takes a value of 1 if the household is credit constrained and 0 otherwise. 
About 17% of households were credit constraint in the sample.  
  The dependent variable in the switching regression model is productivity (Prod). Because 
farmers engaged in several different crops or cattle/sheep production in the survey, we used 
monetary values instead of quantities to measure the productivity to make it comparable across 
households. Productivity was measured as net revenue (production output value-input value) per 
household labor. The explanatory variables in the switching regression models for labor 
productivity include age, education level, number of dependents, real estate value, household 
saving, and number of household members with chronic disease. age
2 is included as the effect of 
age may not be linear. Education is categorized into three levels, elementary school (edu1), 
junior high school (edu2), and high school (edu3). edu1 is used as the base and deleted from the 
regression to avoid singularity. Besides all variables included in the switching regression model, 
if a loan was received before (preloan) and if the loan needed collateral (collateral) are also 
included as instrumental variables in the criterion model for credit constraint. As all surveyed 
households that received loans before and returned their loans on time, we excluded the variable 
whether the loan was repaid on time (return) from the credit constraint equation.  
Estimation Results 
Impacts of Credit Constraint on Productivity 9 
 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the endogenous switch regression model are 
shown in table 2. For criterion equation of the credit constraint, Age increased the odds of being 
credit constrained and the effect was not linear as the coefficient of age2 is significant, too. 
Education, the number of household member with chronic disease, and the number of college 
students in the household had no statistically significant effect on the probability of being credit 
constrained. If a household had more saving, its odds of being credit constrained decreased. This 
result is similar to that of Feder, et al (1990). In contrast, if a household had a higher real estate 
value, their odds of being credit constrained are higher. In addition, if a household had more 
dependents, it would be less likely to be credit constrained. The criterion model also shows that 
if the household had previous loans, it was more likely to get the loan. But collateral did not 
significantly affect the odds of getting a loan.  
For credit constrained households, only saving helped to increase productivity. This 
indicates that liquidity was important for improving productivity. In contrast, many factors 
affected productivity if the household was not credit constrained. This is an important 
implication that if a household was credit constrained, most resources would just keep dormant 
and could not be brought into full play. For example, age did not affect productivity if the 
household was credit constrained. While under credit unconstrained, age had a negative 
significant effect on labor productivity, or younger farmers had higher productivity. Generally, 
farm work is labor intensive. Only without credit constraints could younger farmers make full 
use of their physical advantages. Similarly, education did not affect productivity if the household 
was credit constrained. However, education improved productivity if the household was not 
credit constrained. A farmer with high school education (edu3) had higher productivity 
compared to a farmer with just elementary school education (edu1). The effect of having junior 10 
 
high school education was not significant compared to that of just elementary school education 
as the coefficient of edu2 is not statistically significant. This result has other important 
implications. China has been making great effort to improve rural education level. If the rural 
financing conditions are not improved and farmers are credit constrained, the benefits of higher 
education would not be as supportive on rural productivity as it could be. Therefore, for 
education to improve rural productivity, the problem of rural credit constraints needs to be 
solved first. The result of education is similar to that in Feder, et al (1990).  
The number of dependents in the household positively affected labor productivity in 
unconstrained households. This reflects the fact that kids generally help household farm work 
although they are not counted as labor. The number of household members with chronic disease 
had negative significant effect on household labor productivity. This might be because other 
household member needed to spend time to take care of the member with chronic disease and 
consequently affected their productivity. By comparing to no effect of the number of dependents 
and members with chronic disease in credit constrained household, it implies that under credit 
constraints, increasing or decreasing help to labor would not matter to their productivity, 
reaffirming that input factors may be underutilized because of credit constraints. Interestingly, 
real estate value (revalue) had negative significant effects on the productivity in unconstrained 
households. Saving also had significant positive effects for credit unconstrained households. This 
result is unexpected because if the household was not credit constrained, saving should not 
matter to their productivity. This result implies that even without credit constraints, more 
liquidity in the household can still help improve the productivity perhaps through a self insurance 
mechanism. The number of college students in the household did not have significant effect on 
labor productivity.  11 
 
The correlation coefficients  1   and  2  are both significant. Since  1   is positive and  2  is 
negative, the model indicates that individuals that were credit constrained had lower productivity 
than a random individual from the sample would have, and those who were not credit 
constrained had higher productivity than a random individual from the sample would have. The 
likelihood-ratio test for joint independence of the three equations that is reported in the last row 
of the table showed that these three models are not jointly independent and should not be 
estimated separately.    
The results indicate that credit constraints affect productivity of Chinese farmers. Now 
estimate the magnitude of this impact on productivity to answer by how much would the 
productivity of each labor credit constrained increase if the constraint was removed. Following 
Guirkinger and Boucher (2008), the predicted impact for productivity in each constrained 
household is computed as:  
  ˆˆ ˆ ()
UC
it it X                               (6) 
where  ˆU   and  ˆC   are the parameter estimates for credit unconstrained and credit constrained 
households that are reported in table 2. The results indicate that productivity would increase from 
9.883 thousand yuan to 13.008 thousand yuan if the household was not credit constrained, a 
31.6% increase.  
Impacts of Credit Constraint on Household Income 
Same analysis on productivity was also conducted on household income. All variables 
included in the income equation were the same as those in the equation of productivity except 
that the number of dependent (depnum) was replaced by the number of labor in the household 
(lbnum) and household saving (saving) was excluded. The amount of labor in the household 12 
 
directly affects the total income of the household. The reason for excluding saving from the 
income equation is that income more likely affects saving instead of vice versa. The estimation 
results are shown in table 3.  
Under credit constraints, no variables had significant effects on household income. 
Without credit constrained, households with older household heads would have lower household 
income than those with younger household heads. More household labor increased household 
income. In contrast to in the productivity equation, the number of members with chronic disease 
and the education level of household heads had no effect on household income. However, 
households with more college students had higher household income. This may indicate that 
college students worked while they were studying in the college to help earn income for their 
households. Generally, universities in China are located in urban area where wages are higher 
than in rural areas.  
The coefficients  2   for the correlation between the criterion equation and the income 
equation for credit unconstrained is significant while  1   for the correlation between the criterion 
equation and the income equation for credit constrained is not. Since  2  is negative and 
significant while  1  is not significant, the model suggests that individuals who were credit 
unconstrained had more household income than a random individual from the sample would 
have, and those who were credit constrained did not have higher or lower household income than 
a random individual. The likelihood-ratio test for joint independence of the three equations 
which is reported in the last row of the table showed that these three models are not jointly 
independent and cannot be estimated separately.     13 
 
The calculation of the predicted impact for household income using equation (6) showed 
that if the credit constraint was removed, household income could be improved by 12.46 
thousand yuan, which is about 23.2% increase.   
Conclusions 
In this paper, we use an endogenous switching regression model that accounts for both 
heterogeneity and sample selection issues to examine the effects of credit constraint on 
agricultural productivity and rural household income. The results show that factors have different 
marginal contributions to productivity and income among credit constrained and unconstrained 
households. The productivity-enhancing effects of schooling only occur in credit unconstrained 
households. Young farmers may not be able to take advantage of their comparative advantage for 
physically intensive farm work under credit constraints.  In addition, increasing or decreasing 
help to household labor does not improve productivity. These results imply that under credit 
constraints, production inputs along with farmers’ capabilities and education can not fully 
employed. By removing credit constraints, both agricultural productivity and rural household 
income can be improved substantially, by 31.6% and 23.2%, respectively. Moreover, the study 
suggests that individuals who were credit constrained had lower productivity than a random 
individual from the sample would have, and those who were not credit constrained had higher 
productivity than a random individual from the sample would have. In terms of income, 
individuals who were credit unconstrained had more household income than a random individual 
from the sample would have, and those who were credit constrained did not have higher or lower 
household income than a random individual. 
  This study provides important evidence on the negative effects of credit constraints on 
agricultural productivity and rural household income. Policy makers who aim to improve 14 
 
agricultural productivity and living standard of rural households may need to first reduce credit 
constraints in rural areas to have production factors function fully. With credit constraints, most 
production inputs may not be efficiently used.      
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
   N=511 
variable Description  mean  std 
age  Age of household head in years  45.52  10.21 
age2  Square of age of household head  2176.37 981.18 
edu1 
1 if the farmer has formal education till elementary 
school and 0 otherwise  0.16  0.37 
edu2 
1 if the farmer has formal education till junior high 
school and 0 otherwise  0.79  0.41 
edu3 
1 if the farmer has formal education till high school 
and 0 otherwise  0.05  0.21 
hhnum  Number of household member 3.43  1.27 
lbnum  Number of household labor 2.10  0.82 
depnum  Number of dependents  1.34  1.10 
revalue  Real estate value in 1,000 Yuan  65.95  43.33 
saving  Household saving in 1,000 Yuan  25.04  21.77 
income  Household income in 1,000 Yuan  53.71  42.59 
chrdisnum  Number of household member with chronicle disease 0.10  0.33 
colstdnum  Number of college students  0.05  0.24 
chrdis 
1 if the household has member with chronicle disease 
and 0 otherwise  0.09  0.29 
colstd 
1 if the household has college student and 0 
otherwise 0.05  0.22 
collateral  1 if the loan needs collateral and 0 otherwise  0.44  0.50 
preloan  1 if the household got loan before and 0 otherwise   0.75  0.43 
return 
1 if the previous loan was returned in time and 0 
otherwise 0.81  0.39 
constraint 
1 if the household applied a loan but did not get it or 
just got part of it and 0 otherwise  0.17  0.37 
prod  Productivity, Yuan per household labor  13.59  13.73 
 17 
 
Table 2. Maximum likelihood estimates of the endogenous switching regression model for 
productivity 
Variable Criteria  Equation 







  Coef.  Std. Err  Coef.  Std. Err  Coef.  Std. Err
age 0.116* 0.041 -0.561 0.649 -1.554* 0.267
age2 -0.001* 0.000 0.005 0.007 0.018* 0.003
edu2 0.106 0.181 -0.956 2.502 0.880 1.144
edu3 -0.277 0.379 -5.558 6.138 3.894** 2.118
depnum -0.216* 0.060 1.610 1.049 2.565* 0.383
saving1 -0.015* 0.004 0.146* 0.069 0.404* 0.019
revalue1 0.005* 0.002 -0.042 0.028 -0.050* 0.009
chrdisnum 0.252 0.192 -2.574 2.956 -3.249* 1.251
colstdnum -0.359 0.352 8.788 7.485 2.169 1.649
preloan -1.178 0.287
collateral 0.402* 0.273
_cons -2.549 0.950 12.553 16.554 33.814* 6.441
σ1  11.440* 1.438
σ2 8.474* 0.312
ρ1  0.888* 0.061
ρ1 -0.963* 0.020
LR test for joint 
Independence of  
equations 
                          
2=37 
 Note: * indicates statistically significant at 95% 
           ** indicates statistically significant at 90%. 18 
 
Table 3. Maximum likelihood estimates of the endogenous switching regression model for 
household income 
 
Variable Criteria  Equation 







 Coef.  Std.  Err  Coef.  Std. Err  Coef.  Std. Err
age 0.090* 0.045 -1.761 2.745 -7.613* 1.337
age2 -0.001** 0.000 0.006 0.028 0.080* 0.014
edu2 -0.017 0.203 3.703 10.843 0.566 5.842
edu3 -0.035 0.420 -20.118 28.952 2.701 10.688
revalue1 0.005* 0.002 9.650 6.434 11.673* 2.507
chrdisnum -0.195 0.216 -0.160 0.123 -0.140 0.048
colstdnum -0.598 0.468 -0.809 11.823 -0.043* 6.268
lbnum 0.034 0.108 20.585 39.151 19.475* 8.211
preloan -1.017* 0.351
collateral -0.593** 0.326
_cons -2.397* 1.060 90.734 74.698 203.413* 31.248
σ1  39.063* 3.669
σ2 42.172* 1.545
ρ1  0.331 0.276
ρ1  -0.889* 0.038
LR test for joint 
Independence of  
equations 
                              
2=43.05 
      
Note: * indicates statistically significant at 95%; 
          ** indicates statistically significant at 90%. 